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On the first anniversary of  Vanda, 1) to what extent have legal arguments and claim amendments based on Vanda 
been effective in overcoming 35 USC 101 Mayo-based rejections?; and 2) How are applicants transforming 
diagnostic patent claims into method of  treatment claims to overcome Mayo-based subject matter eligibility 
rejections? 
In 2012, the US Supreme Court 
issued its much anticipated decision 
in the case of  Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc 
(Mayo). The Court concluded that a 
claim directed to a method of  
opt imiz ing dr ug dosag e for 
treatment of  a disorder was patent-
ineligible for being directed to a law 
of  nature, namely “the correlations 
between thiopurine metabolite levels 
and the toxicity and efficacy of  
thiopurine drug dosages”.1 This 
decision had a significant impact on 
the threshold of  patentability for life 
sciences inventions, in particular 
those involv ing methods of  
detection, diagnosis, and treatment.2  
 
One of  the outcomes of  the Mayo 
ruling was a vaguely outlined two-
step enquiry for determining patent 
subject matter eligibility. It came to 
be known as the Mayo/Alice test 
after it was refined in the subsequent 
US Supreme Court decision Alice 
Corp v. CLS Bank (Alice). The test 
assesses eligibility by i) determining 
whether the claim is “directed to” a 
law of  nature (Step A), and ii) if  so, 
identifying whether there are 
additional non-routine or non-
conventional elements so that the 
claim amounts to “significantly 
more” than the natural law (Step B).  
Far from settling the controversy 
surrounding patent subject matter 
eligibility, the application of  the 
Mayo/Alice test has remained unclear 
and its results unpredictable.2  
In an attempt to promote consistent 
patent examination practices, the 
USPTO issued several examination 
guidance documents, providing 
instructions on the application of  
this test3. This guidance included a 
list of  subject matter eligibility 
examples in the life sciences. 
Example 29 set out the USPTO’s  
interpretation of  the Mayo/Alice test 
for methods of  detection, diagnosis, 
and treatment, using a set of  
illustrative claims directed to the 
detection, diagnosis, and treatment 
of  a fictitious disease called “Julitis”. 
The guidance then explained how 
each of  the illustrative claims fared 
against the Mayo/Alice test. The 
claim in Example 29 directed to a 
method of  detection of  the disease was 
considered eligible at Step A (not 
“directed to” a law of  nature). In 
contrast, other claims directed to 
methods of  diagnosis and treatment 
were deemed to be directed to 
natural laws, and were eligible or 
ineligible based on whether or not 
t h e y s a t i s f i e d S t e p B, t h e 
“significantly more” inquiry.3  
It was against this background that, 
on April 13, 2018, the US Court of  
Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
decided Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. 
West-Ward Pharmaceuticals (Vanda)4 
The court held the claims at issue 
were not “directed to” a judicial 
exception, and therefore were patent 
eligible under 35 USC 101. The 
c la ims rec i ted a method of  
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treatment of  schizophrenia with 
iloperidone, where the drug dosage 
is adjusted based on the patient’s 
genotype in order to lower the risk 
of  side effects. Following this 
decision, on June 7, 2018, the 
Deputy Commissioner for Patent 
Examination Policy at the USPTO 
issued a memo to the Patent 
Examining Corps updating its 
guidance on how to evaluate the 
patent eligibility of  method of  
treatment claims in light of  Vanda.5 
The memo emphasized the Federal 
Circuit’s conclusion that “the 
[Vanda] claim was not “directed to” 
the recited natural relationship 
between the patient's genotype and 
the risk of  QTc prolongation,” but 
t o a n a p p l i c a t i o n o f  t h a t 
relationship. The memo stated that 
“methods of  treatment” such as the 
one claimed in Vanda “apply” 
natural relationships, and are not 
“directed to” them. The key 
difference identified in the memo 
between the claim at issue in Mayo 
and the one in Vanda was that the 
Mayo claim focussed on a diagnostic 
test and simply involved a dosage 
adjustment as part of  performing 
the diagnosis, whereas the Vanda 
c la im rec i ted the add i t iona l 
“administration step” of  adjusted 
dosage as part of  a direction to treat 
a particular disease. The memo also 
conceded that in light of  the Vanda 
decision, the two-step Mayo/Alice 
test should have been applied 
differently in Example 29 (Julitis) of  
the USPTO guidance, but would 
nonetheless eventually yield the 
same eligibil ity results. More 
specifically, the method of  treatment 
claims should have been considered 
patent eligible under Step A of  the 
Mayo/Alice test. 
Ta k e n a t f a c e v a l u e , s u c h 
developments could seem just a 
slight shift. But on closer inspection, 
the Vanda decision had the potential 
to be a significant development in 
the evolving domain of  patent 
subject matter eligibility. Not only 
did it unequivocally clarify that 
methods of  treatment could be 
patent eligible under 35 USC 101, 
but it made this determination at 
Step A of  the Mayo/Alice test, thus 
meaning there was no need to 
conduct a Step B analysis, and, 
accordingly, no need to show non-
routine or non-conventional steps in 
the treatment. 
Seen in this light, the shift opened a 
new door for life sciences inventions 
affected by Mayo. But what lay across 
the threshold? We hypothesised in a 
recent empirical study examining the 
impact of  the Mayo decision that, 
after Vanda, patent applicants with a 
rejection for a claim directed to a 
method of  diagnosis might seek to 
amend the claim during prosecution 
into a method of  treatment claim.2 
This could be done, for example, by 
including a drug administration step 
based on the results gathered from 
the diagnostic test.  
To date, the empirical reality has not 
yet been investigated. As some have 
pointed out, such claims might 
create unattractive enforcement 
difficulties for diagnostic companies 
which generally do not administer 
drugs to patients6. There is also 
persistent legal uncertainty - will the 
view of  the Federal Circuit in Vanda 
be upheld by the Supreme Court? 
Research Questions 
In this paper we examine the effect 
of  Vanda on patent prosecution. 
Specifically, we address the following 
research questions:  
1) One year after Vanda, to what 
extent have legal arguments and 
claim amendments based on Vanda 
been effective in overcoming 35 
USC 101 Mayo-based rejections?; and  
2) How are  applicants transforming 
diagnostic patent claims into method 
of  treatment claims to overcome 
Mayo-based subject matter eligibility 
rejections? 
These are significant and open 
questions for practice and law 
reform efforts. Their answers shed 
light into the joint impact of  Mayo 
and Vanda for applicants attempting 
to obtain patent protection for 
inventions involving methods of  
diagnosis and methods of  treatment. 
The method to answer these 
questions (Box 1) is derived from 
similar methods used to analyze the 
impact of  Mayo and Myriad.2,7,8,9 
Results & Examples 
We identified 407 patent cases where 
applicants cited Vanda in their 
response to a USPTO office action 
containing a 35 USC 101 rejection 
citing Mayo. 
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One year after Vanda, to what extent 
have legal arguments and claim 
amendments based on Vanda been 
effective in overcoming 35 USC 101 
Mayo-based rejections? 
At the one year anniversary of  the 
Vanda decision, there were 19 patent 
applications for which there was a 
final disposition: 16 applications 
were allowed and issued as granted 
patents, and 3 were abandoned.  
This represents an allowance rate of  
84.2% for patent applications with a 
rejection citing Mayo where the 
applicant responded to the office 
a c t i o n w i t h a r g u m e n t s a n d 
amendments based on Vanda, and 
for which there is a final disposition. 
This figure is substantially higher 
than the allowance rate previously 
estimated for applications with a 35 
USC 101 rejection citing Mayo 
(35.9%).2 Additionally, in one of  the 
three abandoned cases, the Vanda 
a rgument was succes s fu l in 
overcoming the Mayo rejection.  
Accordingly, this strategy has been 
effective in overcoming the 35 USC 
101 rejection in 89.5% of  the cases 
for which there is a final disposition 
(granted patent issued or final 
abandonment). This sample was 
t h e n m a nu a l l y r e v i e we d t o 
determine the nature of  the legal 
arguments and claim amendments.  
How are applicants transforming 
diagnostic patent claims into method of 
treatment claims to overcome Mayo-based 
subject matter eligibility rejections? 
In order to answer this research 
question, a manual and expert 
review of  the relevant USPTO file 
wrappers was conducted. In 
particular, the prosecution history 
for each of  the granted patent 
applications was downloaded using 
t h e U S P T O PA I R ( P a t e n t 
Application Information Retrieval) 
System. Each application was then 
analyzed and c lass i f ied with 
reference to the first claim receiving 
the 35 USC 101 rejection citing Mayo 
as either: A) a method of  diagnosis 
(and other related claims that are not 
methods of  treatment) or B) a 
method of  treatment. Fig. 1 shows 
the results of  the classification of  
the original patent applications (Fig.
1.a) and the issued patents. (Fig.1.b). 
We found that 80% of  the claims in 
the patent application sample were 
A-type (i.e., methods of  diagnosis or 
related).  
Next we used the prosecution 
histories to follow the fate of  the 
central claim that sorted groups A 
and B. The majority of  the claims in 
group A (diagnostic-related methods 
receiving a Mayo-based rejection) 
subsequently transformed into 
method of  treatment claims in the 
final issued patent. In fact, in 81.3% 
of  the granted/issued patents the 
claims were directed to methods of  
treatment (Fig. 1). The original 
claims in the patent applications, the 
corresponding claims in the granted 
patents, and our classification and 
prosecution notes are included in 
the Supplementary Information. 
Notably, in all 16 cases, modifying 
claim language and citing the Vanda 
decision resulted in a reversal of  the 
existing 35 USC 101 rejection 
(including a Mayo citation), with a 
Notice of  Allowance in the following 
communication. Furthermore, in 
several of  these cases, as shown in 
t h e p r o s e c u t i o n n o t e s 
(Supplementary Information), the 
applicants had already tried several 
times to persuade the examiner, but 
were unsuccessful until Vanda was 
cited in support of  legal arguments 
and proposed claim amendments. 
With rather simple amendments 
that mirrored claim language in 
Vanda, the applicants finally found a 
way to effectively overcome the 35 
USC 101 subject-matter eligibility 
rejection, where previously they had 
been unsuccessful.  
Reviewing the applicants’ arguments 
and claim language in the patent file 
wrappers, we observed three types 
of  successful claim transformations. 
These included: (1) transforming 
non-method of  treatment claims 
(e.g., diagnostics claims) to method 
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Figure 1 Study results. (a) Typology of  patent applications claims with Mayo rejections. (b) Typology of  
granted patent claims after Vanda. The results indicate that a large proportion of  diagnostic related claims 
are being amended to method of  treatment claims to overcome Mayo-based rejections following the 
Vanda decision and corresponding USPTO examination guidance. 
_________________________________________________________________________________
of  treatment claims, (2) altering non-
method of  treatment claims to 
claims analogous to methods of  
treatment, and (3) modifying original 
method of  treatment claims using 
Vanda to guide the claim drafting.  
The first type of  transformation 
(i.e., diagnostic-related claims 
transforming into method of  
treatment claims) was the most 
common, comprising 11 of  the 16 
analyzed granted patents.  
For example , one app l i can t 
transformed the claimed invention 
from a “method for determining, in 
a patient presenting with hematuria, 
the level of  risk for having urothelial 
cancer” to a “method for treating a 
p a t i e n t f o r u r o t h e l i a l 
carcinonma” (case 4, Supplementary 
Information). In this case, while the 
examiner initially rejected the 
claimed invention based on Mayo/
Alice, the simple amendment from a 
method of  determining cancer risk 
to a method of  treatment made the 
claim allowable based on Vanda.  
In another example the applicant 
changed the claim language from a 
“method for diagnosing Systemic 
Lupus Erythematosus (SLE)” to a 
“method of  treating Systemic Lupus 
Erythematosus (SLE) in a human 
subject identified as negative for 
SLE” (case 7, Supplementary 
Information). The initial Mayo-based 
rejection (i.e. that identifying SLE 
disease risk based on various 
antibody levels is merely a naturally 
occurring correlation) was overcome 
by transforming the diagnosis claim 
into a treatment one, in accordance 
with the USPTO Vanda guidance. 
Notably, previous arguments and 
amendments were unsuccessful in 
several previous responses to office 
actions.  
F ina l l y, whi l e some g ranted 
applications did not explicitly 
mention a “method of  treatment,” 
they included an “administration 
step” following the Vanda memo, 
which passed Step A of  the two-step 
eligibility test. For example, an 
applicant changed a three-step 
method of  diagnosing a subject with 
a certain disorder to a six-step 
method of  determining prognosis in 
a subject diagnosed with the 
disorder, in which the fifth step 
comprised “administering to the 
subject with an indication of  
u n f a v o r a b l e p r o g n o s i s a 
treatment” (case 11, Supplementary 
Information). The examiner was 
p e r s u a d e d t h a t t h i s a c t i v e 
administration of  treatment step 
appropriately applied a law of  
nature/natural phenomenon, and 
was therefore patent eligible under 
Vanda (despite being recited at a 
high level of  generality). 
There were three examples of  the 
second type of  transformation (i.e., 
altering non-method of  treatment 
claims to claims analogous to 
methods of  treatment). These 
demonstrated that some examiners 
were open to claims that were 
analogous to method of  treatment 
claims. For instance, an applicant 
modified a “method of  identifying a 
soybean plant that comprises a 
genotype associated with an stem 
canker resistance phenotype” to a 
“method of  producing a population 
of  soybean plants that comprises a 
genotype associated with a stem 
canker resistance phenotype” 
through the crossing of  selected 
s o y b e a n p l a n t s ( c a s e 1 2 , 
Supplementary Information). The 
examiner found the analogy between 
the “crossing step” and a Vanda-type 
“administration step” persuasive, 
and allowed the patent on these 
grounds.  
In another case, an applicant altered 
a method for diagnosing propensity 
to CCLR in a dog to a method for 
breeding a dog, in which the 
“breeding step” to reduce injury 
propensity was found to mirror the 
administration of  treatment step in 
Vanda (case 14, Supplementary 
Information).  
The third type of  transformation 
(i.e., modifying original method of  
treatment claims using Vanda to 
guide the claim drafting) was 
illustrated by two granted patents. In 
these prosecution files, the original 
claims referred to methods of  
treatment, but the applications were 
not allowed until after the Vanda 
ruling.  An applicant in one example 
repeatedly modified a method of  
treating Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever 
to further increase specificity 
(narrowing the scope of  the claim), 
but the patent was only allowed after 
the applicant supplied arguments 
written after the Vanda decision 
( c a s e 1 5 , S u p p l e m e n t a r y 
Information). In these examples, it is 
possible that the claims in their 
original form would have been 
found eligible if  the claims and 
related legal arguments had been 
made after the Vanda guidance.  
In summary, in the cohort of  16 
patents that we manually reviewed 
(patent applications with a rejection 
citing Mayo where the applicant 
responded to the office action with 
arguments and amendments based 
on Vanda, and for which there is a 
final disposition), there was clear 
evidence that most applicants had 
actively changed their claim type and 
language in response to Vanda to 
make their patents allowable. It was 
also evident that examiners had not 
been ready to accept these 
arguments prior to Vanda, but 
clearly became receptive to them 
after the USPTO Vanda Examination 
Memo.  
Pending Applications 
From the 407 patent cases we found 
where applicants cited Vanda in their 
response to a USPTO office action 
containing a 35 USC 101 Mayo-based 
rejection, we analyzed 19 following 
inclusion criteria that required the 
patent application to have been 
issued or abandoned by the 1 year 
anniversary of  the Vanda decision. 
Accordingly, there is a sizeable 
number of  applications (n=388) 
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where applicants cited Vanda in 
response to a Mayo-rejection that are 
still patent pending. This is to be 
expected given standard patent 
prosecution timelines (e.g., up to 6 
months between office actions and 
applicant responses; additional time 
for examiner to consider arguments 
and issue the next communication; 
and 3-6 months from Notice of  
Allowance to patent issuance).  
Within the pending applications 
sample, we identified 35 patent 
applications that had already 
received a Notice of  Allowance 
(NOAs) one year post-Vanda (but 
had not yet issued).  Of  these, 33 
can be classified using the same 
claim transformation typology as the 
original sample: 17 transformed to 
method of  treatment claims from 
diagnostics or other non-treatment 
types (Type 1 transformation), 13 
were o r i g ina l l y me thods o f  
treatment which were allowed after 
Vanda (Type 3 transformations), and 
3 transformed from other types of  
non-treatment claims to claims 
analogous to a method of  treatment 
claim based on Vanda (Type 2 
transformations). 
Discussion 
Vanda’s impact on patent prosecution 
This research confirms our earlier 
hypothesis. Following the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Vanda, as 
interpreted by the USPTO, patent 
applicants with rejected methods of  
diagnosis have sought to transform 
these into patent eligible claims via 
claim amendments – without having 
to satisfy Step B in the Mayo/Alice 
test (showing that the claim amounts 
to significantly more than a natural 
law). Averaging more than one per 
month in the year since Vanda, 
rather than claim a method of  
diagnosis, patent drafters are 
amending to method of  treatment 
(or analogous) claims to avoid or 
overcome Mayo-based rejections. 
This mercurial change, particularly 
its strikingly positive and immediate 
impact on patent examiners, has an 
aura of  legal ‘magic’ about it. 
This has provoked considerable 
controversy and debates about 
whether Vanda was a good decision. 
Parties on both sides of  the debate 
claim that the Vanda decision stands 
to affect “untold numbers of  future 
patents”10 hinting at the idea that 
large numbers of  patentees could be 
affected with major socio-economic 
r am i f i c a t i on s. Our r e s e a r ch 
identified 16 patents in 12 months 
that were issued pursuant to Vanda 
but which otherwise might have 
been rejected pursuant to Mayo (and 
35 additional allowed applications). 
If  Vanda is overruled, these sorts of  
claims (method of  diagnosis and 
method of  treatment claims) would 
be unenforceable unless the claim 
includes ‘significantly more’ (Step B 
Mayo/Alice). At this point, we do not 
think this is a large number of  
patentees. Nevertheless, there are 
important policy issues at stake. 
Diagnostic Companies and Divided 
Infringement  
Holman argued that the Vanda 
solution is inadequate for diagnostic 
companies fac ing Mayo/Ali c e 
rejections, because Vanda-type 
claims (for example drafted as a 
method of  medical treatment claim 
or including a drug administration 
step) may be difficult for them to 
enforce6 aga inst a defendant 
diagnostic company that solely 
provides a diagnostic test and leaves 
drug administration to other 
par t ies11 . I f  the method of  
treatment or administration step 
cannot be at t r ibuted to the 
defendant diagnostic company, then 
the company w i l l no t have 
performed all the steps in the 
patented method and thus is not 
liable for infringement. This type of  
scenario is commonly known as 
divided infringement. Holman 
argues that challenges remain for 
diagnostic companies dealing with 
divided infringement even after the 
en banc US Federa l Circu i t 
reformulated the test of  divided 
infringement law in Akamai12. We 
agree that arguably the Mayo/Alice 
precedent, even post-Vanda, overly 
hampers diagnostic companies with 
bus iness models devoted to 
diagnostic testing. A substantial 
number of  companies operate in the 
molecular and t issue test ing 
diagnostics space rather than selling 
drugs with companion diagnostic 
tests. But in our view, the legal 
position is not necessarily as bleak as 
Holman suggests, and our results in 
relation to Vanda are consistent with 
this.  
Some opt imism comes from 
Akamai since the alleged infringer 
can be liable if  a step in a method 
claim is performed by another actor 
w h e n t h e a l l e g e d i n f r i n g e r 
‘conditions … receipt of  a benefit 
upon performance of  a step…of  a 
patented method and establishes the 
m a n n e r o r t i m i n g o f  t h a t 
performance.’ Potentially a Vanda-
type claim could be enforced against 
a defendant diagnostic company 
(when another actor performs the 
drug administration step) when the 
manifest purpose of  the diagnostic 
test is to determine if  a drug should 
be administered. The defendant 
company arguably creates an Akamai 
scenario where it  conditions receipt 
of  a benefit of  the test (the effect of  
the administered drug for the 
p a t i e n t ) o n a t h i r d p a r t y 
administering the drug. Arguably, the 
defendant diagnostic company also 
establishes the timing of  the 
administration (after receiving the 
test results), and perhaps even the 
manner of  the administration, if, for 
instance, dosage is also determined 
by the test. 
Our research is consistent with a 
d e g r e e o f  o p t i m i s m . 
Notwithstanding on-going debates 
about enforcing Vanda-type claims 
i n s i t u a t i o n s o f  d i v i d e d 
infringement, a significant number 
of  organizations that choose to use 
the Vanda prosecution strategy are 
 5
diagnost ic companies whose 
competitors are likely to be other 
diagnostic companies. It remains an 
open question what proportion of  
diagnostic companies do not use 
Vanda, perhaps for the reasons 
identified by Holman. This is not 
necessarily highly problematic.  They 
could instead seek to draft claims 
that meet Step B. In this regard it is 
important to recall empirical studies 
that indicate that Mayo did not 
sound the death knell for sustainable 
business models for diagnostics. 
Patent prosecution is more drawn 
out and uncertain in the absence of  
a Vanda “administration step,” and 
tends to result in narrower patents 
with potential reduced value, but 
method of  diagnosis patents are still 
issued (when they pass Step B) and 
d i a g n o s t i c c o m p a n i e s h a ve 
continued to invest in and develop 
diagnostic tests.  
Legal Uncertainty 
An issue for the future is the legal 
uncertainty surrounding Vanda, and 
indeed the future of  the Mayo/Alice 
test. Will these legal tests remain the 
cornerstone of  patent eligiblity? 
Three sources of  unpredictability 
include the Supreme Court certiorari 
proceedings currently under way, 
review of  §101 also afoot within the 
US Congress and Senate, and future 
refinement of  the Vanda approach 
by lower courts or the USPTO. For 
example, in the recent INO 
Therapeutics v. Praxair Distrib. Inc., 
2018-1019 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 2019) 
(Nonprecedential), the Majority held 
that the INO claimed method of  
treatment was ineligible under 35 
USC 101. It differentiated the INO 
claims with those in Vanda because 
in this case iNO treatment is withheld 
if  the patient is identified as subject 
to the increased risk (i.e., the 
i nven t ion i nvo lve s the n on -
administration of  the treatment). 
Judge Newman (the most senior 
judged on the CAFC) dissented.  
The US Supreme Court has been 
asked to overrule the Federal 
Circuit’s approach in Vanda. It may 
decide the matter purely with 
reference to the  meaning it thinks 
should be ascribed to the words 
“directed to” within the prevailing 
Mayo/Alice tests. On the other hand, 
now constituted by justices different 
from Chief  Justice Breyer's court in 
Mayo, it might take a bolder 
approach and revisit Mayo, perhaps 
recasting it so that the Mayo/Alice 
test is significantly changed, perhaps 
even abandoned.  
There is considerable debate 
whether - assuming the law is 
unsatisfactory - the root of  the 
problem is Mayo/Alice, or the legal 
refinements in cases such as Vanda. 
A view put forward in the certiorari 
proceedings is that the problem rests 
with Vanda because it introduces an 
unsatisfactory gloss on the Mayo 
exception. According to Counsel for 
Hikma, and Professor Sarnoff  et al 
(Amici) a method of  medical 
treatment claim is no different from 
a claim that claims a law of  nature 
with general instructions “to apply 
it” unless the claim includes non-
conventional steps in addition to the 
n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d m e d i c a l 
correlation10. 
Responding to the view that Mayo, 
Alice and Myriad are the source of  
the problem, a group of  senators, 
headed by Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) 
and Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.), 
announced a draft bill in May 2019 
which would bypass the judicially 
created exceptions to subject matter 
eligibility including the Supreme 
Court decisions in Mayo, Myriad and 
Alice. The bill has received mixed 
reactions ranging from strong 
support to harsh criticism, as 
evidenced by the June hearings of  
t h e U S S e n a t e J u d i c i a r y 
Subcommittee on Intellectual 
Property. Most recently, at the end 
of  July, a group of  law professors, 
former chief  judges of  the US 
Federal Circuit, and former heads of  
the USPTO sent a letter to the IP 
Committee in support of  the bill. In 
contrast , the American Civi l 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and other 
medical, health, and civil rights 
organizations have expressed 
vehement opposition. 
Comparison with Europe 
Vanda focuses legal minds on the 
meaning of  the words “directed to” 
in the Mayo/Alice test. Is a patent 
claim “directed to” a law of  nature 
(Step A) if  it claims an application 
of  the natural law in the format of  
“a method of  medical treatment.” Is 
t h i s a g e n u i n e l y ‘ p r a c t i c a l 
application’ such that the patent 
claim is no longer “directed to” a 
law of  nature but actually “directed 
to” a patent-eligible invention by 
integrating the laws of  nature into 
an inventive concept? The claim still 
recites a law of  nature, but is it 
“directed to" that law? What about 
situations where the claim includes 
nothing additional apart from well-
understood, routine, conventional 
activity?  
This sort of  analysis has a sense of  
ha i r-sp l i t t ing. The European 
approach avoids the semantic 
meaning of  the words “directed to”, 
and might therefore hold some 
appeal. However, it too has become 
mired in controversial micro-analysis 
of  words. Under the European 
Patent Convention claims shall not 
be granted to “discoveries or 
scientific theories …as such"13. The 
qualifier ‘as such’ is open to multiple 
meanings - just like the qualifier 
‘ d i r e c t e d t o ’ . N o t w i t h o u t 
controversy, EPC case law has taken 
the route that excludes claims only if  
they pertain solely to a discovery or 
scientific theory. Claims with a 
‘technical’ element or technical 
application included in the claim are 
eligible even when the core leap 
forward was the scientific discovery 
or theory.  
This can seem more cut-and-dry, 
less demanding, and helpful for legal 
cer ta inty. But the European 
approach has its own controversies 
 6
and additional considerations. For 
example, defining the metes and 
bounds of  technicality, technical 
effect, technical character and their 
relation to other patentability criteria 
remains one of  the most disputed 
issues in European patent law14. The 
current situation is that it is relatively 
easy for competent draftspersons to 
draft a token technical element. 
Some think this is sensible because 
the key issue then becomes whether 
the claim is novel and inventive. 
Othe r s th ink the European 
approach fails to protect the proper 
spirit of  the EPC exclusion and 
allows claims which are, in essence, 
natural correlations.  
According to EPO case law, if  the 
claim includes any kind of  technical 
contribution it is elevated from a 
claim that claims a discovery or 
scientific theory as such to a claim 
that is patent eligible. In other 
words, the ‘as such’ element means 
that if  the claim pertains to no more 
than a discovery or scientific theory it is 
patent ineligible. This is less 
demanding than Step B of  the 
Mayo/Alice test, and less semantic 
than the words ‘directed to’. In 
Europe, the technical element – 
which shifts the claim from an 
ineligible discovery to eligible 
subject matter– can include the 
process of  diagnosis if  the process 
includes collection of  physical 
specimens, kits or platforms. This is 
quite unlike Mayo/Alice and Vanda, 
where the process of  diagnosis is 
considered a mere instruction to 
apply a natural phenomenon (so the 
claim is still ‘directed to’ the natural 
phenomenon) and insufficient to 
change a patent ineligible claim to an 
eligible one. In Europe, the technical 
element can also be achieved by 
focusing on  a new use of  a drug, 
akin to a method of  medical 
treatment and analogous to Vanda. 
For completeness, it is important to 
add that in Europe, methods of  
treatment and diagnostic methods 
practiced “on” the human body are 
excluded from European patent 
protection by a separate provision 
of  patent law, but this provision 
does not apply to in vitro diagnosis 
n o r p r o d uc t s , i n p a r t i cu l a r 
substances or compositions, for use 
in any of  these methods (EPC Art 
53(c)). 
Conclusion 
These and other issues show there is 
much to be considered in the future. 
In the short term, if  Vanda is 
upheld, and certiorari denied, patent 
attorneys with pending patent 
app l i c a t i on s r e c e iv i ng Mayo 
rejections would do well to consider 
whether amendment to a method of  
medical treatment claim might assist 
their client. In doing so, our research 
indicates they are likely to have more 
and/or swifter success persuading 
examiners i f  they l ink their 
a r g u m e n t s t o t h e U S P T O 
Examination guidance rather than 
case law alone. Meanwhile patent 
law scholars might like to ponder 
whether Vanda is another example 
o f  t h e p r e - e m i n e n c e o f  
draftsmanship notwithstanding 
repeated calls from the Supreme 
Court to avoid this.15  
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